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Introduction
This paper studies the effect of monetary policy on the delinquency rate of business loans and consumer credit in the US. Since delinquent loans are loans whose repayment is overdue for more than 30 days, the ratio of delinquent to total loans (the delinquency rate) is closely monitored by the Federal Reserve Bank as a measure of the quality of loans, and as a proxy for the default probability of loans.
1
The paper first studies the effect of monetary policy on delinquencies empirically using a structural VAR model identified with external instruments, following the methodology of Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Stock and Watson (2012) . It then uses comparative statics on the debt contract of Townsend (1979) and Bernanke et al. (1999) to develop an economic intuition of what might drive the empirical results.
From an empirical point of view, identifying the causal effect of a monetary intervention on the default rate of loans is not straightforward, as one needs to establish if the federal funds rate is exogenous to delinquency rates. It could be argued that the federal funds rate is exogenous to expected future defaults. For instance, financial stability concerns rarely appear in the Minutes of the FOMC before the 2007 crisis, as documented by Dell'Ariccia et al. (2013) . However, while not set directly as a function of future defaults, the federal funds rate might respond to expected future defaults indirectly, given that defaults are correlated with economic activity.
2 As such, an impulse response that predicts that a monetary expansion increases delinquency rates might still be driven by the fact that the Federal Reserve Bank expanded monetary policy in anticipation of a downturn in economic activity.
In the empirical part of the paper, I address the above identification challenge using a VAR model for the period between 1987Q1 and 2008Q4, and identify the model using external instruments. I use several instruments for monetary policy shocks, combining in a 2SLS estimation the instruments generated by the three most widely used approaches in the literature. In particular, I use the Romer and
Romer shocks (developed by Romer and Romer, 2004) , the shocks identified from a recursive large VAR model (for which I use the estimates by Bańbura et al., 2010) and the shocks estimated from futures contracts on the federal funds rate (which I take from Barakchian and Crowe, 2013) . The advantage of this comprehensive approach is that it avoids having to choose a single identification strategy, a choice which would prove hard given the limited consensus in the literature on which methodology is the best one. The Proxy VAR based on the instruments used in this paper combines the information content of the Federal Reserve Banks' expectations included in the Greenbook forecasts, the information content of a large dataset used in the VAR and the model-free information content from high-frequency data from financial markets. For robustness, I also propose an orthogonalization of the shocks with regard to a set of financial variables.
The empirical part of the paper finds that an expansionary monetary policy shock decreases the delinquency rate of both business loans and consumer credit. optimal defaults to discuss the interaction of these partial and general equilibrium effects.
The literature on monetary policy and central banking has dedicated considerable attention to the incentives of banks to take on more risk after monetary expansions. This has been done using either microeconomic data (for example by Jimenez et al., 2014 , Maddaloni and Peydro, 2013 and Altunbas et al., 2014 or aggregate variations in credit standards (Buch et al., 2014a and Afanasyeva and Güntner, 2014) and leverage (Angeloni et al., 2015) . The present paper does not directly inspect the risk taking channel of monetary policy, which relates to an ex ante incentive by banks to issue new loans and would require a different type of data. However, an indirect link to the risk taking literature can be established from the fact that the average maturity of loans in the dataset is only 5 quarters. This means that, on average, the documented decrease in delinquency rates following a monetary expansion regards at least in part newly issued loans.
While most of the attention in this literature has regarded the ex ante incentives to take on risk, Buch et al. (2014b) extend the analysis to study if ex post, backwardlooking measures of risk are capable of signalling the additional risk. Using a sign restricted VAR model, they find that the share of nonperforming loans held by banks decreases after a monetary expansion, and interpret the result in terms of the positive effect of monetary policy on the interest rate burden on firms. I contribute to the literature by providing further empirical evidence that backward looking measures of risk tend to decrease after a monetary expansion, and I do so using a Proxy VAR model. I then show that the general equilibrium effect used to interpret the results in this paper as well as in Buch et al. (2014b) is consistent with an off-the-shelf model featuring a credit channel. The empirical results are also consistent with Jimenez et al. (2014) , who find that the default probability of existing loans decreases after a monetary expansion, and De Graeve et al. (2008), who find that banks' probability of distress decreases after a monetary expansion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical analysis, discussing the data, the identification strategy and the results. Section 3 outlines the key mechanism behind a standard model of defaults and uses comparative statics to interpret the results. Section 4 concludes.
A Proxy SVAR on delinquency rates
This section discusses the data used to measure defaults and introduces the differ- Figure 1 shows the evolution of the deseasonalized delinquency rates used in the analysis. The average of the delinquency rates on business loans and consumer credit equals 3.10% and 3.43%, respectively, while the standard deviations equal 164 basis points and 37 basis points, respectively. Both series are strongly countercyclical. In particular, the period covered includes several cycles, i.e. the build up of delinquencies during the recession in the early 1990s, the recession that followed the dotcom bubble and the period of high financial instability that began in summer 2007.
Monetary shocks
Identifying the effects of monetary policy on delinquency rates requires isolating fluctuations in the federal funds rate that are exogenous to the Federal Reserve's expectations of future delinquency rates (see also Cochrane, 2004 , for a comment on this point). The literature has developed several methodologies to estimate monetary shocks. Since it is not clear a priori which of these methodologies is more likely to deliver shocks that are exogenous to the Federal Reserve's forecasts of defaults, I identify the SVAR developed in the next section using simultaneously different candidate shocks. In particular, I use the time series of candidate monetary shocks representing the three most popular approaches from in the literature.
The first series of monetary shocks is taken from Romer and Romer (2004) .
These shocks are obtained from the residual in the regression of an index of the intended variations of the federal funds rate on the Federal Reserve's forecasts of real output growth, the GDP deflator, and the unemployment rate. The second series is taken from a recursively identified large VAR model by Bańbura et al. (2010) . I use the medium specification of their model, which includes twenty variables. 4 The third series of monetary shocks is taken from Barakchian and Crowe (2013) . They build on Kuttner (2001) and compute the variation in the policy rate that was not expected by the markets, using different maturities on the futures contracts on the federal fund rate. Only the period after 1987Q1 of the original series of the shocks is used in the analysis. The Romer and Romer shocks are estimated using the data collected by Coibion et al. (2012) , who extend the analysis by Romer and Romer (2004) The shocks discussed in this section are used as instruments to identify the VAR model of the next section.
Identification of the VAR and impulse responses
I use a parsimonious VAR model consisting of five variables: log of CPI, log of GDP, the federal funds rate, the delinquency rate of business loans and the delinquency rate of credit loans. 6 The VAR model can be written as As discussed in Mertens and Ravn (2013) , Stock and Watson (2012) and Karadi (2015) , to identify b call j = 3 the equation in which the federal funds rate enters as dependent variable. As a first step, project u jt on m t , where u jt is the reduced form VAR innovation of equation j at time t and m t represents the vector of all instruments at time t. Then regress each of the remaining VAR residuals u i,t on the fitted value of the above regression, and store the coefficient γ i . Last, combine the computed vector (γ 1 , γ 2 , 1, γ 4 , γ 5 ) with the covariance restrictionsΣ = BB from the VAR to estimate the vectorb.
The above statisticb is a consistent estimator for b provided that the validity of the instruments is satisfied. With regard to the application of external instruments to VAR models, the validity condition consists two requirements. First, that the instruments are correlated with the shock of interest (i.e. E(s mp t m t ) = 0). Second, that the instruments are not correlated with the remaining shocks (i.e. E(s * t m t ) = 0). These conditions are fundamentally untestable. However, the strength of the instruments can be assessed by studying the relationship between the instruments and the VAR innovations. This can be done for example by regressing each VAR innovations on the instruments. The results of these tests are shown in Table   1 . The F statistic of the joint significance of the coefficients corresponding to the three shocks in the equation of the policy variable is above 10 and suggests that the instruments are jointly valid with regard to the application of the VAR considered.
The R 2 in this regression equals 0.30.
Mertens and Ravn (2013) compute confidence intervals using a Wild bootstrap.
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As shown in Figure 6 , in the application of this paper such procedure yields extremely wide confidence intervals, probably due to the limited availability on data on delinquency rates. For this reason, I compute confidence bands using a standard bootstrap that accounts for estimation uncertainty of the reduced for VAR and partly for identification uncertainty. GDP within the first quarter after the shock. Real GDP displays a hump-shaped 7 This bootstrap procedure consists of two steps. First, generate pseudo VAR innovations by randomly changing sign of the vector estimated VAR innovations at each period and by generating pseudo data from the pseudo residuals. Second, identify the model estimated on pseudo data using pseudo instruments, which differ from the original instruments for the sign, which has been changed for all periods in which the sign of the reduced form innovations was changed.
8 The bootstrap procedure first generates pseudo data by bootstrapping on the entire vector of estimated VAR innovations, which is in turn achieved by randomly selecting, for each period t, a vector of estimated innovations out of the entire set of vectors from t = 1, 2, ..., T . This yields an empirical distribution ofÂ(L) andΣ from equation (1), with Σ = BB . The algorithm then identifies the model estimated on pseudo data using the generatedΣ and the original (rather than the bootstrapped) instruments. Figure 6 also considers alternative bootstrapping procedures.
response. After the initial expansion, monetary policy endogenously becomes contractionary, following a timing that is consistent with the increase in CPI and real GDP. Delinquency rates respond slowly and decrease in a statistically significant way. The initial 25 basis point reduction in the federal funds rate decreases the delinquency rate of business loans and on consumer credit by around 13 and 6 basis points, respectively. This equals around 8% and 15% of the corresponding standard deviations, respectively, suggesting that the results are economically meaningful, although not large. The minimum is reached around 2 years after the monetary stimulus.
Robustness checks
It has been discussed in Section 2.2 that for the purpose of the analysis in this paper, The thought experiment behind the first exercise can be rationalized as follows.
While unobserved, the Federal Reserve's expectation at time t of future defaults is realistically some unknown function of variables, up to time t − 1, that are informative of the future financial strength of borrowers. Financial variables that could proxy the unobserved expected defaults are the previous values of the delinquency rates, the previous values of the leverage ratios, the previous values of the debt-to-GDP ratio of firms and of households, and the previous values of banks' reserves to total loans. To reduce the risk that the three series of candidate monetary shocks include information potentially informative of future delinquency rates, I extract the first r = 1, 2, .., 7 principal components of the above 7 variables and regress the candidate series of monetary shocks on the first lag of the principal component(s).
The generated "orthogonalized" shocks are then used to identify the model, as outlined in the previous section.
The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 4 . The figure is constructed by overlapping Figure 3 with the point estimates of the impulse responses computed on the orthogonalized monetary shocks when using r = 1, 2, .., 7 principal components.
These explain a minimum of 40% of the variability in the variables included.
9 All generated impulse responses are very close to the point estimate from the baseline specification. The F statistics on the residual of the federal funds rate from Table 1 (unreported) remained in the range between 9.5 and 11.5, supporting the strength of the instruments used. The confidence intervals (unreported) became in certain Table 1 for these two cases equal 19 and 9, respectively, suggesting that the Romer and Romer shocks are particularly strong instruments. From Figure 5 , we see that the results on the effect on the delinquency rates remains largely unchanged. The response of CPI using the shocks from the large VAR is surprisingly strong on impact, suggesting that it is these shocks that drive the relatively fast contemporaneous response of CPI from Figure 3 . The response estimated using the shocks from Futures contracts are reported with the dashed line. On first impression, the responses seem to contradict the result that delinquency rates decrease in response to a monetary expansion. However, closer inspection suggests that this response cannot safely be interpreted as a monetary expansion since output decreases on impact and in a statistically significant way.
The F statistic is also small and equals 5.
A simple model of defaults
The empirical analysis in the previous section does not find empirical evidence that delinquency rates increase in response to an exogenous monetary expansion. The results point towards a decrease in the delinquency rate of both business loans and consumer credit, where the response occurs relatively slowly and with the strongest effect around two years from the shock. This section uses a simplified and standard debt contract to interpret this empirical results.
The model, which consists of the debt contract by Townsend (1979) used in Bernanke et al. (1999) , is not used to replicate quantitatively the responses from 
Environment
A risk-neutral borrower has limited net worth N . At the beginning of the period he borrows K − N from a risk-neutral lender, where K stands for the level of investment. The borrower has access to the following production function:
The shock ω represents an idiosyncratic productivity shock with support [0, ∞), expected value of 1 and cumulative distribution function Ψ(ω). R k stands for the aggregate return on the risky technology.
In a general equilibrium environment R k is stochastic and is unexpectedly pushed up by the monetary expansion due to an outward shift of the aggregate demand curve. This is, for instance, the case in the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) application of the model. I simplify the analysis by treating R k as deterministic and by using comparative statics. The contract is signed at the beginning of the period. The shock ω is realized at the end of the period. ω is costlessly observed by the borrower, but it is not observed by the lender unless she pays a fraction µ < 1 of ex post revenues ωR k K. The borrower obtains credit from a lender in competitive markets. The contract maximizes the expected profits of the borrower under the condition that the expected return on lending equals the gross opportunity cost of lending R. Townsend (1979) shows that, in this setting, the optimal contract is a simple debt contract, i.e., the borrower either repays a fixed amount independently on the realization of the shock or defaults. 11 Let R b stand for the gross borrowing rate. When the borrower and the lender agree on K − N and R b they indirectly agree on an endogenous threshold valueω below which the borrower's revenues are insufficient to cover the debt repayment obligation. This threshold value is pinned
Debt contract
and keeps profits ωR k K − R b (K − N ). If ω <ω, then the borrower defaults and the lender recovers (1 − µ)ωR k K.
The maximization problem is solved inω, R b , K and is written as
Equation (2) defines the threshold valueω as a function of R b and K. Equation (3) gives the participation constraint of the lender. This constraint imposes that the expected return on lending is not lower than the opportunity cost of lending.
Ex post variations of R k moveω in the opposite direction, given that the remaining variables in equation (2) are determined at the beginning of the period.
Substitute R b from equation (2) into equation (3) and into the objective function in order to simplify the maximization problem to
To develop intuition behind the notation, use F (ω) and G(ω) and the assumption E(ω) = 1 to derive the following equality:
Equation (4) shows that F (ω) and G(ω) determine the shares of expected output R k K net of expected monitoring costs µ ω 0 ωR k KdΨ(ω) allocated to the borrower and the lender, respectively. 12 These shares are implicitly pinned down by the debt contract. It can be shown that, in the relevant support of ω, F (ω) < 0 and
Borrowing conditions that indirectly imply a higher share of expected revenues to the borrower imply a lower share of expected revenues to the lender. An increase in the share of expected revenues promised to the lender G(ω) is associated with an increase in the default thresholdω, because it is harder for the borrower to meet the higher repayment obligation to the lender. Nevertheless, it has the benefit of relaxing the participation constraint of the lender. The equilibrium of the model is pinned down by this trade-off. To solve the maximization problem, substitute out K from the objective function and derive the optimality condition with respect toω:
Discussion of the equilibrium
The threshold valueω * pinned down by equation (5) is a decreasing function of R for any parametrization of the model (see Covas and Den Haan (2012) , appendix C). 13 This means that, given R k , a decrease in the opportunity cost of lending, which proxies the policy rate changed by the central bank, increases the equilibrium default probability of the borrower. Nevertheless, in general equilibrium, this effect could be dominated by other effects. To develop the economic intuition that explains this difference I use a simple graphical representation. and R k , a higher leverage ratio implies a higher default rate. This occurs because perfect competition pushes down the return on lending, implying now a lower borrowing rate for any given level of lending. If K remains constant, the borrower borrows the same amount and pays a lower borrowing rate due to perfect competition. This would decrease the default probability. Never- 13 Covas and Den Haan (2012) study the relationship betweenω * and R k . Their proof extends to the relationship betweenω * and R. 14 To see this, substitute equation (2) in the cumulative distribution function of ω, obtaining
theless, borrowing the same amount is not optimal, since the discounted return to capital R k /R has increased, making each unit of investment more productive in discounted terms. Investing more requires moving along the new participation constraint of the lender and paying the lender a higher expected share of revenues G(ω), due to the leverage effect discussed above. In the partial equilibrium model, this leverage effect always dominates, taking the new equilibrium to point B. The new partial equilibrium features a higher default probability. Put it simply, debt becomes cheaper, the borrower demands more credit, and since his leverage ratio increases, his default probability increases.
Consider now the general equilibrium effect. In Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) , the borrower is an entrepreneur who rents capital to intermediate good producers. The return to capital R k equals the rental rate on capital plus the capital gain on undepreciated capital. In their general equilibrium framework, the unexpected monetary expansion increases investments. This pushes up the price of capital, which in turn generates a positive capital gain and increases the return to capital, increasing the borrower's revenues and his future net worth. In the model, it is this increase in aggregate demand, through the increase in investments, that pushes up the borrower's income. This mechanism can be captured in a stylized way by assuming that the decrease in the opportunity cost of lending pushes up the value of R k at the end of the period, i.e. the value that enters equation (2). The effect on defaults can be seen from panel c) of Figure 10 . Since leverage K/N and the borrowing rate R b are determined at the beginning of the period, an increase in R k unexpectedly increases the borrower's income. This pushes up the curve in the right graph. If this effect is relatively weak, then aggregate defaults still increase, although by less than in partial equilibrium (point C ). If, instead, the elasticity of R k to R is high enough in absolute value, the curve on the right graph shifts by enough that defaults ultimately decrease (point C ). Put it simply, in general equilibrium the increase in income exerts the opposite effect on defaults when compared to risk-taking incentives, and potentially prevents risk-taking behaviour from materializing into higher defaults. Notes: For each column, the equation estimated is u i,t = α + β 1 m 1,t + β 2 m 2,t + β 3 m 3,t + µ t , where u i,t is the VAR innovation on equation i, indicated in the column, and m i,t , i = 1, 2, 3 are the shocks used. The F statistic reported and the corresponding pvalues refer to the null hypothesis β 1 = β 2 = β 3 = 0. Notes: A decrease in the opportunity cost of lending relaxes the participation constraint of the lender and reduces the cost of borrowing. The borrower reacts to the lower cost of borrowing by leveraging up his net worth in order to invest more, and this increases the default probability (point B). In general equilibrium, the return to capital increases unexpectedly, exerting downward pressure on defaults (point C and C ). If this effect is strong enough, equilibrium defaults decrease.
